

DTK-1488

24 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT : Comparative Analysis of the US Policy on Internal Defense in Selected Foreign Countries (FIDP), 1968, and the US Overseas Internal Defense Policy (USOIDP), 1962

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this paper is to make a comparative analysis of the US Policy on Internal Defense in Selected Foreign Countries (short title "Foreign Internal Defense Policy" - FIDP) which was promulgated on 23 May 1968, and which supersedes the US Overseas Internal Defense Policy (USOIDP) which was published in 1962. Since this document is a major policy statement concerning US foreign policy in overseas areas relating to internal defense, it becomes of considerable interest to Operations Training, Staff II, which is responsible for presenting training to Career Trainees and other selected personnel in the field of insurgency, counterinsurgency, and internal defense and development.

2. BACKGROUND:

a. National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 182 of 24 August 1962 promulgated the US Overseas Internal Defense Policy (USOIDP). NSAM No. 182 provided that the USOIDP was to serve as basic policy guidance to US diplomatic missions and military commands abroad, as well as to the government educational system. The document was prepared by an Interdepartmental Committee consisting of representatives of State (chair), DOD, JCS, USIA, CIA, and USAID.

b. The purpose of the USOIDP was to provide the responsible executive agencies of the US Government with policy guidance for the employment of US resources to prevent or defeat subversive insurgency and to assist in the development of balanced capabilities for the total defense of free world societies against the threat of internal attack. It was concerned with the prevention and defeat of (1) communist inspired, supported, or directed subversive insurgency, and (2) other types of subversion and insurgency which are inimical to US national security interests in all countries of the free world, primarily those that are underdeveloped, whether they are pro-Western, or basically neutral. The scope of the document embraced the range of US measures to assist vulnerable regimes in preventing and defeating subversion and insurgency described above.

c. The newly promulgated directive, entitled the FIDP, is designed to incorporate six years of experience and changes of policy emphasis in a new document available to all agencies.

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### 3. FORMAT:

a. An immediate comparison can be made between the old USOIDP, which was 31 pages in length, and the new FIDP, which consists of less than 10 pages, by comparing the formats of the two documents. Copies of the formats of the USOIDP and the FIDP are attached hereto as Annexes A and B respectively.

b. USOIDP: The old USOIDP practically constituted a manual on the subject of subversive insurgency, counterinsurgency, and internal defense. It included a chapter on the background of subversive insurgency and organized violence, including the pattern, the factors involved, classic models, and lessons learned. Another chapter highlighted the nature of the communist threat, discussed the environment, causes of insurgency, critical sectors, and finally communist doctrine and tactics. A chapter discussed US objectives, interests, and the US role in internal defense. A portion was devoted to US strategy and included both non-communist and subversive insurgency. Finally, a chapter was devoted to the application of US strategy and statements were included on the concept of operations and on the roles and missions of each responsible executive agency of the US Government. Annexes to the USOIDP included (1) Supplementary Role of the Department of Defense, (2) Glossary of Terms, and (3) a model outline of a country internal defense plan. The document was very comprehensive and left little open to interpretation.

c. FIDP: By comparison, the FIDP is very general in nature. It makes minimum reference to communism, subversive insurgency and counterinsurgency and focuses on internal defense, institution building, and the strengthening of selected underdeveloped or emerging nations in which an internal security situation represents a threat to significant US interests. It gives broad guidance on the problems of internal security, the US position, the importance of local (indigenous) efforts, US actions, and policy implementation. It outlines courses of action which we should follow.

### 4. MAIN CLARIFICATIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS OF THE FIDP:

a. It is intended to clarify the US role. The concept of the US as "the world's anti-communist gendarme" is rejected and the need for limitation on US commitment is recognized. (For an excellent discussion on our ability to abandon our role as world policeman, and likewise on our ability to be "strictly selective" on countries to receive internal defense aid, see the article "We Can't Resign as Policeman of the World," by Irving Kristol, The New York Times Magazine, 12 May 1968, attached.)

b. With respect to "selectivity," it states that US activities in the field of internal defense should be limited to those few countries in which (1) we have a significant national interest, (2) there is clear evidence that internal disorder or subversion threatens that interest, (3) there is an indigenous will to resist as well as the desire and capability to use effectively US assistance, and (4) the resources and assistance needed to maintain internal security are not available from other sources.

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c. It recognizes that the modernization process in developing countries is inherently disorderly ... and violence must therefore be anticipated as part of the development pattern.

d. It stresses that assistance in the field of foreign internal defense cannot be considered in isolation from the whole range of political, economic, social, cultural, and psychological factors which comprise total US involvement with a given country.

e. It calls for compilation of a new listing of high priority countries which meet the revised criteria.

f. The policy directive will have the effect of narrowing the number of countries subject to the new procedures.

g. It emphasizes that internal defense considerations should focus on improving the capability of the country itself to strengthen its own internal security, using US programs and resources in supporting roles.

5. THE US POSITION: The US position in the new FIDP is a significant change from the position in the old USOIDP. The following excerpts point up these changes in policy:

a. The development of institutions responsive to local national patterns is more important than progress toward an objective goal of representative democratic institutions as the US has traditionally viewed them.

b. The process of modernization in developing countries is often de-stabilizing in itself, and changes in political and social systems are often accomplished by revolutionary activity..... It is important to make a distinction between disorder and insurgency which may be a function of national growth and that which is a result of subversion.

c. The US does not regard every situation of political instability or social disorder and violence as a foreign internal security problem threatening US interests and requiring US assistance for internal defense programs. In some cases (it) is deserving of support and encouragement from the US.

d. In countries where significant US interests are not threatened by internal disorder or subversion, the US should seek to avoid becoming involved in internal defense .... of local governments.

e. The process of change within a country is largely stimulated by local initiative, guided by national leaders, reliant on indigenous resources, and ultimately bears a national trademark. ....the US should persuade the countries concerned to do as much as they can for their own internal defense.

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f. When external assistance is necessary, the US should urge other resource abundant nations to provide help and should, insofar as feasible, work through international and multilateral institutions.

6. SUMMARY: In summarizing the differences between the new FIDP and the old USOIDP, we can state that -

a. The FIDP provides broad, general guidance as opposed to the specific and detailed guidance in the USOIDP.

b. It provides for highly selective internal defense assistance as opposed to the massive worldwide assistance visualized in the USOIDP.

c. It emphasizes strengthening the internal defense of countries designated to receive assistance as opposed to the USOIDP approach of counterinsurgency.

d. It minimizes reference to the Soviet and Chicom threat, and recognizes that not all internal upheaval is communist inspired.

e. It fails to specify the roles and missions of the various executive agencies of the US Government, and merely directs that the several agencies update their roles specified in the USOIDP.

f. It makes minimum reference to the functions of the Country Team.

g. It replaces the function of the old Special Group CI with the Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG's) and the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG).

h. It has no glossary - which can lead to eventual misinterpretation by the several agencies.

  
Chief, Operations Training, Staff II

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Attachments:

1. Annex A - Format of USOIDP
2. Annex B - Format of FIDP
3. N.Y Sunday Times Article, 12 May 68

Distribution:

- Orig. & 2 - Adm. w/attchs.  
1 - Chrono

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